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Fiscal sustainability is a recurrent topic that coun-
tries ponder with some regularity. At the beginning
of the 1920s,when writing about France’s public debt
problem, Keynes (1923, p. 24) mentioned the need
for the French government to conduct a sustainable
fiscal policy in order to satisfy its budget constraint.
Keynes stated that the absence of sustainability
would be evident when “the state’s contractual lia-
bilities (…) have reached an excessive proportion of
the national income”. In modern terms, there is a
problem of sustainability when government rev-
enues are not sufficient to keep on financing the
costs associated with the new issuance of public debt
or,in Keynes’s words,when “it has become clear that
the claims of the bond-holders are more than the tax
payers can support” (p. 55).
In the last two decades several developed countries
have experienced difficulties coping with budget
deficits, and accordingly economists are examining
the issue more closely.This is an important topic both
in terms of economics and public policy. The issue is
paramount notably for the euro area since equilibri-
um growth paths and the single monetary policy need
to be supported by adequate and sound fiscal policy.
Furthermore, the treaties governing the European
Union impose the practical necessity of sustainable
public accounts. For instance, it is possible to assess
sustainable public finances in terms of compliance
with the budgetary requirements of the European
Monetary Union, i.e. avoiding excessive deficits,
keeping debt levels below the 60 percent of GDP
reference value, and respecting the “close to balance
or in surplus” requirement of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP). From a forward-looking per-
spective, one may also notice that the SGP imposes
commitments on member states for budgetary posi-
tions in the medium-term. Therefore, sustainability
could be de facto ensured,provided budget balances
respect a “close to balance or in surplus” target.
The issue of sustainability
Fiscal policy sustainability is sometimes associated
with the financial solvency of the government. In
practice, however, what the empirical literature ends
up testing is whether both public expenditures and
government revenues will continue to display their
historical growth patterns in the future.If a given fis-
cal policy turns out to be unsustainable, it has to
change in order to guarantee that the future primary
balances are consistent with government budget
constraint, essentially the relation between govern-
ment assets and liabilities in any period in time.
Theoretically any value for the budget deficit would
be possible if the government could raise its liabili-
ties without limit.Obviously,that is not feasible since
the government is faced with the possibility that, at
some point, the public may refuse to buy more gov-
ernment debt or demand too high an interest rate on
it. It also is worth noticing that the hypothesis of fis-
cal policy sustainability is related to the condition
that the trajectory of the main macroeconomic vari-
ables is not affected by the choice between the is-
suance of public debt and the increase in taxation.
Under certain conditions, it would be irrelevant how
the deficits are financed, implying the assumption of
the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis, as stated al-
ready in the early nineteenth century by David
Ricardo (1820).1
In more technical terms, a sustainable fiscal policy
should ensure that the present value of the stock of
public debt goes to zero in infinity.This would mean
that the present value of the existing stock of public
debt will be identical to the present value of future
primary surpluses. In other words, it implies impos-
ing the absence of Ponzi games and the fulfilment of
the so-called intertemporal budget constraint.2 Faced
with this condition,governments will have to achieve
future primary surpluses whose present value adds
up to the current value of the stock of public debt.
Put still another way, public debt in real terms can-
not increase indefinitely at a growth rate beyond the
real interest rate, and the government cannot play
Ponzi games forever.3
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How to assess the sustainability
of fiscal policy
A common practice in the litera-
ture is to investigate past fiscal
data to see if government debt
follows a stationary process or to
establish if there is co-integration
between government revenues
and government expenditures,
that is, if revenues and expendi-
tures move closely together in an
almost one-to-one relationship.4
Therefore the procedure to assess
the sustainability of the intertem-
poral government budget constraint involves testing
the following co-integration regression between rev-
enues, R, and spending, G:Rt = a +bGt +ut. Several
conclusions may then be established:5
i) When there is no co-integration, the fiscal deficit
is not sustainable,
ii) When there is co-integration with b=1, the deficit
is sustainable,
iii)When there is co-integration, with b < 1, govern-
ment expenditures grow faster than government
revenues,and the deficit may not be sustainable. 6
Some stylised fiscal facts in the EU-15
It seems relevant to mention some stylised facts on
government debt developments for the EU-15 coun-
tries.7 Between the beginning of the 1970s and the
end of the 1990s the debt-to-GDP ratio exhibited an
increasing trend for most countries throughout the
period. For instance, general government debt in-
creased in Italy from 37.9 percent of GDP in 1970,to
110.6 percent of GDP in 2000.In Germany the debt-
to-GDP ratio was 18.2 percent in 1970 and went be-
yond the 60 percent level in 1997. According to
European Commission data, in 2003 three countries
still had a debt-to-GDP ratio above 100 percent (Ita-
ly, Belgium and Greece), while in three other coun-
tries the debt ratio was higher than 60 percent (Aus-
tria, Germany and France).
In the period 1970–2003 the highest debt-to-GDP ra-
tios were reported in Italy and Belgium (the country
with the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in that period),
and their high debt service payments induced sub-
stantial budget deficits despite primary budget sur-
pluses.A reversal of that general trend is noticeable
only at the end of the 1990s, as the several “more in-
debted”countries tried to fulfil or at least come clos-
er to the Maastricht debt criterion.
The consequences of choosing different fiscal poli-
cies may be exemplified by looking, for instance, at
the public debt paths of some of the EU countries,as
depicted in Figure 1. For instance, the adding-up of
successive and significant budget deficits in Italy and
in Belgium had a clearly identifiable impact on gov-
ernment debt, with the debt-to-GDP ratio rising
steadily until the middle of the 1990s. Germany and
France also exhibited a slowly growing debt ratio
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand,
the debt ratio in the UK followed an overall down-
ward path, while Ireland changed from being a high
debt country in the 1980s to a “less indebted” coun-
try in the 1990s.
With regard to government expenditures and rev-
enues, the main conclusion seems to be that the bur-
den of public expenditures and revenues on GDP
has increased since the 1970s in almost every coun-
4 Assuming that government revenues and expenditures are non-
stationary variables and that their first differences are stationary
variables,this implies that both series in levels are integrated of or-
der one. Therefore, these two variables should be co-integrated
with co-integration vector (1, –1) to ensure stationarity. See
Hamilton and Flavin (1986),Trehan and Walsh (1991), and Hakkio
and Rush (1991).
5 See Afonso (2005a), for a more detailed technical presentation.
6 Hakkio and Rush (1991) demonstrate that if G and R are non-sta-
tionary variables in levels,the condition 0 < b < 1 is a sufficient con-
dition for the budget constraint to hold. However, when revenues
and expenditures are expressed as a percentage of GDP or in per
capita terms, it is necessary to have b = 1 in order for the trajecto-
ry of the debt to GDP not to diverge in an infinite horizon.Quintos
(1995) and Ahmed and Rogers (1995) further discuss the necessary
conditions for sustainability in terms of the order of integration of
public debt.
7 Notice that only explicit government debt is considered. Indeed,
implicit debt is outside the scope of the analysis since methods for
computing it,notably future pension-related liabilities,are far from
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Source: Afonso (2005a), data from the AMECO database.
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Figure 1try. Another stylised fact is that between 1970 and
2003, the ratio of government expenditures to GDP,
for most countries, exhibited a higher growth rate
than the ratio of government revenues to GDP.This
conclusion holds for all countries except for Bel-
gium, Ireland and Italy.This increase in total expen-
ditures must be seen against a background where
governments gradually tried to focus economic poli-
cy towards a better fulfilment of the usually defined
“Musgravian” goals: macroeconomic stabilisation,
income redistribution and more efficient resource al-
location. In fact, it was during the 1970s and 1980s
that most industrialised countries increased the cov-
erage of social programmes, such as unemployment
insurance.
Fiscal sustainability in the EU-15: evidence from
government debt
Afonso (2005a) applied unit root tests to the stock of
real public debt for the period 1970–2003,also taking
into account the fact that there may be structural
breaks in the debt series. For instance, this could be
the case for Germany due to reunification in 1990.
Therefore, following a recursive approach, the null
hypothesis that the debt series has a unit root can be
tested against the alternative of stationarity with
structural change at some unknown break date cho-
sen endogenously.Table 1 summarises results for the
existence of stationarity in the debt series, alongside
with the detected break dates.
The results allow for the rejection of the unit root hy-
pothesis, therefore the existence of sustainability may
be possible for Austria, Finland, Germany, Sweden
and the UK,using the overall results of both reported
tests. However, in general there is not much evidence
against the unit-root hypothesis for most of the debt
series in the EU-15 countries; in other words the sus-
tainability hypothesis is mostly not supported.
Interestingly, most of the breaks reported in Table 1
seem to cluster in the 1990s and more specifically 
in the first half of the decade, notably Austria in
1991/92, Finland in 1990/91 and Germany in 1993/94.
One can also mention that,for instance,in Finland the
debt-to-GDP ratio increased by more than threefold
between 1990 and 1992 (while there was a severe re-
cession in 1991/92).On the other hand,the estimated
break date for Germany occurs only in 1993.
One should also notice that the number of observa-
tions used is only 33 at most, and the accuracy prob-
lems of unit root tests with small samples are well
known. However, the alternative approach of using
quarterly data would constrain the time period, so
that it is usually preferable to use a longer sample of
annual data instead of more observations along a
smaller time span. Furthermore, the rejection of the
stationarity hypothesis does not mean that public ac-
counts are not sustainable.Indeed,the stationarity of
the variation of the stock of public debt is a sufficient
condition, and stationarity rejection does not neces-
sarily imply the absence of sustainability in the gov-
ernment accounts.8
Fiscal sustainability in the EU-
15: evidence from total revenues
and expenditures
Visual inspection of the revenue
and expenditure time series for a
given country may provide an
early clue regarding fiscal sus-
tainability. This is exemplified in
Figure 2, which depicts govern-
ment expenditures and revenues,
as a percentage of GDP, for Italy,
Germany,France and the Nether-
lands. One suspects in advance
that Italy and France may not
pass the sustainability tests.
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Table 1 
Test results for sustainability in general government debt
Zivot and Andrews










Austria 1970–2003  1992  Yes 1991  No
Belgium 1970–2003  1991  No 1988  No
Denmark 1971–2003  1993  No 1989  No
Finland 1970–2003  1991  Yes 1990  Yes
France 1977–2003  1988  No 1988  No
Germany 1970–2003  1994  No 1993  Yes
Greece 1970–2003  1978  No 1991  No
Ireland 1970–2003  1985  No 1984  No
Italy 1970–2003  1991  No 1990  No
Luxembourg 1970–2003  1986 No 2000 No
Netherlands 1975–2003  1991 No 1986 No
Portugal 1973–2003  1984  No 1991  No
Spain 1970–2003  1992  No 1991  No
Sweden 1970–2003  1997  No 1999  Yes
United Kingdom 1970–2003  1987  Yes 1986  Yes
Source: Afonso (2005a). 8 See Trehan and Walsh (1991).CESifo DICE Report 1/2006 37
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Table 2 reports the results of co-integration tests per-
formed with the government revenues and expendi-
tures as a percentage of GDP (only for the cases
where there is a significant co-integrating relation).
According to such results, it seems possible to reject
the hypothesis of fiscal policy sustainability for the
majority of the countries. Indeed, only for Austria,
Germany,Finland,Netherlands and Portugal is there
a significant co-integration relationship between rev-
enue and expenditure. However, even then the esti-
mated coefficients for expenditures, where govern-
ment revenues are the dependent variable, are al-
ways less than one. As a matter
of fact, for each one percentage
point of GDP increase in public
expenditures, for instance, in the
Netherlands and in Germany,pub-
lic revenues only increase respec-
tively by 0.634 and 0.521 percent-
age points of GDP. Notice that
these two countries are the ones
where the estimated coefficient b
in the co-integrating relationship
has the highest absolute value.
For the other countries where a
significant co-integration relation
was found, b is much lower in ab-
solute value.
In other words, for the period
1970–2003, government expen-
ditures in the above-mentioned
countries exhibited a higher
growth rate than public reve-
nues, challenging therefore the
hypothesis of fiscal policy sus-
tainability. These results suggest
that fiscal policy may not have
been sustainable for most countries, with the possi-
ble exceptions of Germany and the Netherlands.
Conclusion
The fiscal policy sustainability issue was discussed in
this note, using the government budget constraint as
the key element of the analysis for the EU-15.
Formally, such constraint requires that all future net
tax revenues (i.e. tax revenues less transfers of cur-
rent and all future generations measured in present
value terms) are enough to cover the present value
of future government consumption and to service
the existing stock of government debt.
With few exceptions, EU-15 governments might
have sustainability problems, although debt-to-
GDP ratios showed signs of stabilising at the end
of the 1990s. Using government expenditures and
revenues as a percentage of GDP, a co-integration
relation was identified for Austria, Germany,
Finland, the Netherlands and Portugal. However,
the estimated coefficients for expenditures in the
co-integration equations for those countries,where


































































































































































































































GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND REVENUES
 % of GDP  % of GDP
Source: Afonso (2005a), data from the AMECO database.
Expenditures                             Revenues
Italy
France
 % of GDP
Germany
Netherlands
 % of GDP
Figure 2
Table 2 
Co-integration of government revenues and 




Austria [1 –0.380]*** [1 –0.418]**
Germany [1 –0.521]** [1 –0.629]**
Finland [1 –0.343]** [1 –0.368]*
Netherlands [1 –0.634]** [1 –0.665]**
Portugal [1 –0.205]*** [1 –0.174]***
Notes: The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respec-
tively. Only co-integrating relations with at least a
10% significance level are reported.
 Source: Afonso (2005a).Overall, the reported results are comparable with the
ones from some of the existing cross-country litera-
ture and might be considered “unpleasant” from a
policy-maker’s point of view.9 A small number of
countries seems to emerge as less likely to exhibit sus-
tainability problems, namely Germany, the Nether-
lands,Finland and Austria.Of these,Germany and the
Netherlands almost always appear less likely to have
sustainability problems. The results presented also
show that even for these two countries the absolute
value of the relevant estimated coefficient in the co-
integration relation is quite below unity,implying that
their fiscal positions may not be sustainable.
Therefore, the aforementioned countries face the
problem of having a higher growth rate for expendi-
tures than the growth rate of revenues. In other
words, if fiscal policy were to be conducted in the fu-
ture as it was in the past, there could be some prob-
lems ahead, even for this set of countries that started,
early in the 1990s, to make efforts in order to meet
strict budgetary criteria. This problem may even be-
come more critical in the light of available projections
for the EU15 countries, concerning future public fi-
nancial responsibilities. As a matter of fact, the EC
(2001) reported that ageing populations could lead to
increased expenditure on public pensions by between
3 and 5 percentage points of GDP in most member
states, with larger increases in several countries.
Moreover, fiscal developments during the period
2001–2003 in several EU15 countries do not seem re-
assuring in terms of sustainability of public finances.
Since population shifts towards older societies is an
entirely new phenomenon,it cannot be considered in
econometric results based exclusively on past data.
This does not constitute a general criticism against
purely econometric methods of measuring fiscal sus-
tainability but is instead an argument for expanding
the database. Indeed, implicit public pension liabili-
ties, as part of a country’s global fiscal imbalance,
have to be understood as future borrowing require-
ments,not fully embedded in the public fiscal figures,
leading therefore to added sustainability problems.10
Finally,these results,as most of the results reported in
the literature, are obtained without considering addi-
tional sources of government revenues, for instance
privatisation revenues. Information on privatisation
revenues is not easily available for the EU-15 coun-
tries.Additionally, government assets (wealth) should
be taken into account to make judgements about the
sustainability of public finances (even though data are
mostly lacking).
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